In this article we examine the impact of devolution on electoral politics in Scotland and 5 Wales. After reviewing the electoral history of the two territories, we set out the result for the 1999 and 2003 devolved elections, noting the substantial differences between voting patterns in these elections from those for the UK parliament. We then go on to consider the main reasons why voting patterns differ across the two types of poll. The paper concludes by summarizing the main findings and then considering both the implications of the 10 findings for future devolved elections and the potential contribution of the study of such elections to broader theories of voting behavior.
on to explore why many voters appear to behave differently in the different types of election. Finally, the concluding section briefly summarizes our main findings before considering the implications our findings have for future devolved elections and what the study of devolved elections may have to contribute to broader theories of electoral 5 behavior.
Electoral Politics in Scotland and Wales
By the time of the first elections to the SP and NAW in May 1999, the electoral politics of Scotland and Wales had come to assume strikingly similar features. Both nations had witnessed the electoral wipeout of the Conservative Party in the May 1997 UK 10 general election, as the Tories were left with parliamentary representation from English constituencies alone. Both were by now bastions of the Labour Party-a dominance extended further in the 1997 poll. And both Scotland and Wales had indigenous nationalist parties (the Scottish National Party [SNP] and Plaid Cymru, respectively) attaining modest but significant levels of electoral support and 15 parliamentary representation. However, these parallel positions had been arrived at via two strikingly contrasting routes. To explain the context within which the devolved elections have been fought, we first present a brief overview of the electoral history of Scotland and Wales.
The Historical Legacy
20 For most of the democratic era, Welsh politics has experienced a marked paucity of serious electoral competition. One-party domination has generally prevailed-first under the Liberals and subsequently Labour. Liberal hegemony was initiated by the franchise reforms of the 1870s and 1880s that substantially widened voting rights (Morgan 1981, 26-58, 123-155) . In the 1885 election, the Liberals won thirty of thirty- 25 four Welsh seats. In subsequent elections the overwhelming majority of Welsh constituencies, both rural and industrial, remained impregnably Liberal; the Conservatives retained a foothold in only a few, heavily anglicized, areas. Liberal domination reached a zenith in 1906: only one non-Liberal was elected, Labour's Keir Hardie, himself dependent on Liberal support. Even growing industrial militancy in 30 the years before 1914 made little impression on Liberal hegemony. However, the pillars that had underpinned Liberal hegemony in Walesnonconformist religious affiliation, the Welsh language, and a confident sense of Welsh identity-proved unsustainable in the face of the deep splits in the Liberal Party that ensued during World War I; the economic disintegration experienced by Wales in 35 the postwar years; and the corrosive power of social change, including deepening secularization and anglicization. In retrospect, the interwar years now appear as an interregnum between the decline of one hegemony and the rise of a second. While the personal magnetism of Lloyd George continued to hold sway over much of rural, Welsh-speaking Wales (in the 1929 election, for example, five of the successful candidates were either family members or closely associated with the family circle [Morgan 1981, 275] ), the Labour Party was developing into the new dominant force in Welsh politics. By 1922, Labour was garnering 40.8 percent of the vote in Wales; even 5 in the otherwise disastrous 1931 election, its share of the Welsh vote increased (to 44.1 percent), and the foundations were being laid for the almost total Labour dominance that followed after World War II. At the 1945 general election, Labour won a stunning 58.5 percent of Welsh votes (compared with 48 percent for the United Kingdom as a whole, and 47.6 percent in 10 Scotland), inaugurating a new hegemony. The fortunes of the once mighty Liberals have never really threatened to revive, while for the Conservatives, with the exception of a few atypical constituencies, most of the country has remained alien territory (Wyn Jones et al. 2002) . Aside from a brief period in the mid-to late 1960s when their 1966 Carmarthen by-election victory precipitated a surge in Plaid Cymru support, the 15 nationalists also never threatened Labour's dominance. Indeed, from the mid-1970s Plaid Cymru became increasingly dependent on the votes of Welsh speakers along the country's western coast, while over much of the country its vote was derisory. And when focused through the prism of the nonproportional (single-member district plurality) electoral system used for UK general elections, the unbalanced electoral 20 preferences of Welsh voters have been further exacerbated in favor of the largest party, Labour. Lopsided electoral competition has been a much less consistent feature of Scottish politics. In contrast to Wales-where the Conservatives were alienated from most of the population by religious, linguistic, and other cultural differences-an indigenous 25 Tory tradition existed in Scotland. In combination with a Liberal unionism that arose in the 1880s out of fierce opposition to Prime Minister Gladstone's policy of Home Rule for Ireland, Conservatism was able not only to challenge the Liberals for dominance of Scottish politics early in the twentieth century but to persist as a major electoral force well into the second half of the century. The merger of the Conservative 30 and Liberal unionist parties in Scotland in 1912-until 1965 fighting elections under the banner of the Scottish Unionists-created a political movement that flourished as ''a coalition of forces adapted to the contours of the Scottish political landscape'' (Keating 2005, 50; see also Mitchell 1990 ). This coalition encompassed much of the urban middle classes as well as rural landowners and prosperous farmers-the familiar 35 social bases of Conservative support in England and Wales. But its unionist aspect also drew in large numbers of ''Orange'' Protestant, working-class voters from communities with strong links to their counterparts in Northern Ireland. Conservative unionism gained a plurality of the Scottish vote, and a majority of its parliamentary representation, in 1931 and 1935, and The party that benefited most from Conservative decline was Labour, which from 1964 onward has always been Scotland's strongest party. But the Liberals have also made ground as-unlike in most of England-they have built effectively concentrated support, mainly in rural northern Scotland. The performance of the SNP has been 10 more volatile. The SNP's highpoint in the October 1974 election saw it accrue 30.4 percent of the Scottish vote, but in UK general elections since it has never yet seriously threatened Labour's dominance in terms either of votes or of parliamentary representation.
The Devolved Elections
15 Elections to the SP and NAW concern institutions that vary not only in the powers that they wield but also somewhat in their electoral arrangements. In Scotland, the parliament is a 129-member body, elected through the two-vote, mixed-member proportional system used, inter alia, in postwar Germany. Single-member constituencies elect seventy-three representatives, with the remaining fifty-six allocated from 20 eight regional party lists via the d'Hondt formula. Wales' Assembly comprises forty constituency members and another twenty elected from five regional lists. As in Scotland, regional representatives are allocated via d'Hondt in order to achieve greater proportionality; however, with only one-third list members, Wales' arrangements will almost invariably produce rather less proportional outcomes. 25 1999. A combination of the electoral system and the history of Labour dominance meant that the first devolved election in Wales was almost universally expected to produce a Labour majority. This was despite negative publicity experienced by the party after the resignation amidst personal scandal of the Welsh Labour leader in fall 1998, and an ensuing and bitterly divisive leadership contest that followed. Given prior 30 expectations, the election result was shocking, producing some remarkable contrasts .4 percent on the second (list) vote, and it fell short of a majority in the sixty-seat Assembly. There was also a significant fall in Conservative support from their already 5 mediocre 1997 performance, putting the Tories in a (poor) third place. Most dramatic of all, however, was a substantial advance in support for Plaid Cymru-from 10 percent in 1997 to 28.4 percent on the first vote and 30.5 percent on the second. The Scottish result was markedly similar to the Welsh one, but this was much less of a shock than in Wales. The electoral system made it highly unlikely that Labour (or any 10 other single party) would ever win a majority in the SP; furthermore, a significant advance by the SNP had been anticipated by the opinion polls for more than a year before the election, and the final result detailed in table 2 was actually a significant relief to the Scottish Labour Party (which went on to form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats). 2003. Four years on, 3 the second set of devolved elections occurred in a broader political context that had been dominated for some months by the United Kingdom's controversial involvement in the United States-led war in Iraq. The fact that the elections were held three weeks after the fall of Baghdad-and thus during the rather brief period when the war was generally popular in the United Kingdom-was almost had publicly opposed the war (the Liberal Democrats and the two nationalist parties) fell below their expectations (see tables 3 and 4). In Wales, Labour had recovered from the leadership disputes that had damaged them in 1999 and ran an effective campaign targeted at winning back constituency 5 seats lost four years previously. Defeating Plaid Cymru in several key constituency battles, Labour won thirty seats and effective control of the Assembly. Plaid Cymruwhich had in the intervening period seen a popular party leader retire and be replaced by someone, Ieuan Wyn Jones, who proved to have little public appeal-lost five seats (four constituency and one list) and saw a substantial decline from their 1999 vote 10 share, while the Conservatives surprised most observers with a significant increase in vote share, winning them two extra list seats. It appeared that the 1999 nationalist tide had ebbed and politics in Wales had returned to ''normal,'' with Labour dominantalthough a closer look at the 2003 results reveals that Labour's victory was achieved by the narrowest of margins, despite the party making only modest gains on a 15 ''disastrous'' 1999 performance and attaining a vote share some 16 percent below that achieved in the 1997 UK election. In Scotland, Labour's vote share declined significantly on 1999, but the party comfortably held its position as the largest party, benefiting enormously from the weakness of the SNP. Like their Welsh counterparts, the nationalists had fought the 20 election under a new and uninspiring party leader ( John Swinney); in consequence, votes lost by Labour went not to the SNP but, in the main, to the minor parties (notably the Greens and the Scottish Socialists), who collectively secured a substantial share of the list vote and several additional seats. Devolved elections have not produced a new party system in Scotland and Wales; 25 the major parties contesting Westminster elections have continued to be the leading forces in elections to the SP and the NAW. However, the behavior of Scottish and Welsh voters has not necessarily followed the same patterns as for the Westminster level. Two devolved elections have seen somewhat lower levels of support for the Labour Party than has long been typical in UK general elections and- 30 notwithstanding their setback in 2003-greater levels of support for the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties. The task for the following sections of this article will be to explain why this has occurred.
Exploring Electoral Politics under Devolution
This section begins the process of trying to understand voting behavior in devolved 5 elections by addressing a simple question: do significant numbers of voters behave differently in devolved as compared with Westminster elections? Our ''null'' hypothesis here is that voting behavior does not systematically differ between the two electoral arenas. 20 below, index of dissimilarity scores (which can be interpreted as the net proportion of voters having differing preferences across the two electoral arenas) act as a useful summary index.
The electoral shock experienced in Wales by Labour in 1999 was doubtless related in 25 part to the bad publicity generated by the party before the election. Nonetheless-and contrary to our null hypothesis-there was no general rejection of the Labour Party voters, while the gains made by Plaid Cymru from 1997 appear of much smaller magnitude. This pattern-of voters making alternative electoral choices for different political arenas-was not a peculiarity of the Welsh. We see in table 6 a very similar pattern for Scotland, with the SNP scoring a notably lower level of support in the 5 (hypothetical) context of Westminster than for the SP, while for Labour (and also to a slight extent the Conservatives) the opposite is true. Thus, it would appear that even in the inaugural devolved elections, many voters were capable of distinguishing this political arena from Westminster.
2001
10 Although many voters appear to have had different voting preferences for UK and devolved elections in 1999, it remains possible that this was a one-off artifact of peculiarities of the first devolved polls. In tables 7 and 8, therefore, we use data from postelection surveys conducted after the 2001 UK general election. The comparison here is the obverse of that conducted on the 1999 data: between how 15 people report having voted in the Westminster election of that year and how they say Understanding Voting in Devolved Elections 25 An obvious starting point for explaining voting in devolved elections is with the empirical generalizations and analytical frameworks produced by work that has studied analogous elections elsewhere. 7 One important literature is that on ''electoral cycles,'' which shows a consistent trend, across many different national contexts, for parties holding national government office to experience losses in popularity until 30 about the midpoint of their term and then to recover some support. 8 The evidence for such cycles includes voting at substate elections. Given that the 1999 and 2003 devolved elections both occurred at exactly the midterm of the United Kingdom-level government, an electoral cycle interpretation appears consistent with the lower levels of support enjoyed by Labour. But such general trends in party support offer little 35 explanatory purchase on why, in the empirical analysis reported above, such stark differences were observed in voter preferences between the United Kingdom and the devolved electoral arenas at a single point in time. Work on second-order elections (SOEs) has provided a powerful account of voting for the European Parliament, and this framework has also been applied to substate elections. 9 The most advanced formulations of SOE approaches (see particularly van der Eijk and Franklin 1996) incorporate elements of electoral cycles literature but go well beyond the latter in contending that elections other than ''first-order,'' statewide polls produce certain characteristic phenomena. A first is relatively low turnout: with 5 less at stake than in first-order elections, fewer people vote. But among those who do vote, factors relevant to statewide politics-most particularly the popularity of the national government-are dominant in guiding voting choices, rather than matters specific to the ostensible purpose of the elections themselves. Patterns of decline in support for governing parties in substate elections, noted in work on 10 electoral cycles, have been interpreted within the SOE literature as a symptom of the more general primacy of first-order considerations in shaping voting decisions at a secondary level. Given the low turnouts experienced in devolved elections 10 and the patterns of voting observed (consistent with many voters using devolved elections to cast a protest 15 vote), an SOE interpretation of devolved elections has superficial plausibility. But this does not warrant the immediate acceptance of such an interpretation. The track record of SOE approaches in explaining substate elections is distinctly patchy. While holding up well in some contexts (such as regional elections in Germany and many such contests in Spain), 11 previous work has indicated SOE interpretations to be least 20 satisfactory in contexts (such as the ''historic nationalities'' in Spain-the Basques, Catalans, and Galicians) that bear a strong prima facie similarity to Scotland and Wales as regions with a strong sense of cultural and political distinctiveness. Experience there suggests that that ''regional elections in the historic nationalities at least are clearly not 'second order' elections, but rather operate according to a distinctive region-specific 25 dynamic'' (Hough and Jeffery 2003, 249) . One symptom of this dynamic is that electoral support for regionalist/nationalist parties is consistently higher at regional elections than for statewide contests. The literature on multilevel voting (MLV) has developed from the recognition that first-order factors should not be assumed to be the dominant drivers of voting patterns 30 in substate elections. 12 The importance of such factors can vary, spatially and temporally. And it is possible that some political parties will perform systematically better in some types of elections than others for reasons bearing little relation to those identified by SOE theories. MLV approaches suggest some long-term expectations for devolved elections-notably that the relative success of the nationalists in this sphere is 35 likely to be an enduring feature. But an MLV perspective on devolved elections also generates testable implications that are clearly distinct from those implied by SOE approaches. The MLV approach predicts that many voters, and particularly those voting differently at a devolved election than at a Westminster election, will be focused on factors specific to Scotland/Wales in making their voting choices. By contrast, SOE 40 theory would suggest that we should expect United Kingdom-wide considerations to be dominant in shaping voting choices.
Our previous research has shown the MLV approach to offer the more satisfactory explanation of voting in the 1999 devolved election in Wales (Trystan et al. 2003) . In this article, we extend our analysis to cover both Scotland First, we include two dummy variables if a respondent reported according priority to ''Welsh'' or ''British'' considerations, respectively, in deciding how to vote. 25 Second, we include a series of questions gauging respondents' perceptions of the impact of the devolved institutions on three major policy issues: health care, education and the state of the economy. Third, we also have a series of questions gauging perceptions of the impact of the Westminster government on health, education, and the economy. 30 Fourth, we include evaluative ratings on the three major UK political party leaders and the Scottish/Welsh leaders of the four major parties. 15 Finally, we include a question concerning respondents' opinions on the United Kingdom's involvement in the Iraq war. (Further details on all these variables, and the survey questions that they relate to, are given in Appendix 2).
35
Results from the analysis are reported in tables 11 and 12. They show a reasonable fit to the data (better in Wales than Scotland). 16 The results also indicate that in addition to some impact for the control variables entered in the model-the SNP finds it more difficult to win support among older and more affluent Scottish voters; Plaid 40 Cymru is relatively unsuccessful at winning support among the middle classesthere are also some interesting results among the variables of more immediate theoretical importance. The patterns for individual variables are not wholly consistent between the two nations. In Wales, both Plaid Cymru loyalists and switchers are disproportionately those most focused on Welsh matters for making voting choices; both groups were also relatively favorable to the Plaid Cymru leader and strongly 5 antipathetic to the UK prime minister. In Scotland, SNP loyalists were strongly Weighted N ¼ 481 *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Scotland focused in making their voting decisions and far less concerned with UK issues than other voters, but these variables do not show any significant impact for SNP switchers. And although SNP loyalists show considerable hostility to Tony Blair, more consistent are SNP voters' attitudes to the two main Scottish leaders-both ''national'' (i.e., statewide) factors shaping voting behavior in certain characteristic ways. What is not very clearly theorized is why this vacuum exists: discussions have a tendency to conflate one clear possible factor shaping election turnout and behavior (the substantive consequences of an election, often seen as a function of the powers of the body being elected) with 5 another factor that is usually less clearly articulated (the extent to which voters are asked to make choices in an electoral context that is meaningful to them). The latterto the extent that it has been discussed-has sometimes been related to the political campaigns surrounding an election. For example, the most detailed discussion of European Parliament elections suggests that a ''vacuum'' persists because of the lack of 10 discussion of, and choices about, the European Union offered by the major parties in these elections (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996) . An alternative perspective, however, would point to the importance of nationalism. Nationalism is not only the dominant single organizing principle of political life across today's world; it has also been shown to be a very strong force shaping electoral 15 competition and voting behavior (Caramani 2004 4. Note that we define the null hypothesis in terms of systematic differences. Some random variation in how people vote across different electoral contexts is virtually inevitable; we are interested in the extent to which there is significant variation in particular and potentially 5 explicable directions.
5. Index of dissimilarity scores are calculated as one-half of the aggregate of (absolute value) differences in levels of party support across the two electoral arenas. Although we calculate this measure using the standard formula used elsewhere, we deploy the measure differently from other authors (e.g. Hough and Jeffery 2003) . Previous work, lacking survey data, 10 has compared recent election results for statewide and regional elections. Our method (calculating the index for survey data on voting preferences gathered at a single point in time) allows for a more direct summation of the extent of differences in partisan preferences across alternative electoral arenas at a single point in time.
6. The findings discussed in this section concern only aggregate patterns of electoral support. Conservative leader), and Jim Wallace (Scottish Liberal Democrat leader and deputy first minister). Because evaluations for Duncan-Smith and Kennedy were not reported in the Scottish data, they are omitted from the Scotland analysis.
16. The absence of many significant coefficients despite the fairly high pseudo R 2 figure can be partly attributed to the relatively low number of cases in the different categories of 25 ''nonsupporter,'' ''loyalist,'' and ''switcher.'' On the goodness-of-fit measure, see Nagelkerke (1991) .
